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The modem, sophisticated anti-shipping missile (ASM) is a major threat to surface 
warships. To provide protection against ASM, several ECM techniques were developed and 
successfully deployed. However, the competition between attackers and defenders never has an 
end. Weapon systems and defense systems are inciting each other to a more elevated level. To 
ensure the effectiveness of ASM against conventional·ECM techniques, monopulse tracking, 
frequency and amplitude modulations, home-on-jam mode, frequency agility/diversity and chaff 
discrimination are all used together in constructing ASM seekers. This makes conventional ECM 
techniques less effective. 
This problem can be solved by integrating off-board active decoys into the ECM 
family. The decoys provide a high ·fidelity return signal to the enemy radar, at the proper power 
level, frequency, time, and angle, and with all associated modulations. To any ECCM technique 
listed above, an active off-board decoy appears to be a real and more attractive target. 
There are several ways to deploy off-board active decoys to protect ships. Each method 
has its trade-off Decoys can be deployed by helicopter, towed by ship, launched by rocket then 
kept in air by parachute. This thesis examines the use of a shipboard rocket-launched active 
electronic buoy. The buoy is cheaper in operation than a helicopter deployed decoy, it can operate 
longer than a parachute decoy, and provides better flexibility for the ship to maneuver than a 
towed decoy. For these reasons, it is a preferred way to deploy a decoy. 
There are several factors which should be considered to ensure the effectiveness of the 
rocket launched active buoy decoy. These include deployment angle, deployment range and the 
proper power gain. This thesis uses MATLAB to simulate an anti-shipping missile attack 
scenario, and determine the best way to use an active decoy to protect the ship. 
2 
D. GENERAL SCENARIO 
A. ANTI-SHIPPING MISSILES ATTACK PROCEDURES 
A typical anti-shipping missile attack procedure includes target acquistion, target tracking, 
midcourse guidance, and terminal guidance. 
1. Target Acquisition 
Figure 1 demonstrates target acquisition. This is done by the platform of the missile or by 
another sensor, then the data is provided to the missile platform through a data link or other 
means of communication. At this stage, the defending ship might or might not be able to pick up 
any sign of the threat. This is because the frequencies and PRFs of surface search radars are 
similar to that of the navigation radars used by cargo ships. This radar information does not 
always provide significant threat information to the defending ship. If the missile is equipped 
with a data link or other advance communication systems, it is even more difficult for the 
defending ship to recive early warning by intercepting the transmitted data. 
Airborne Radar ~:~:==---· 
h . 
Communication Link 
/ ~ w,M,, -~~·  7\ Target Ship 
Missile Platform ~ 
Co~onL~ _j_ 
Land-based Radar 
Figure 1. Target Acquisition 
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2. Target Tracking 
Similar to the target acquisition stage, target tracking can be performed by other sensor 
platforms and data linked to the missile launching vehicle or received by the missile vehicle itself 
Generally, the link method is preferred by the attacker side, because it can extend the attack range 
over the horizon. A typical target tracking scenario is shown in Figure 2. The helicopter performs 
as a remote sensor, it provides data on the target ship to the missile launching vehicle. The attack 
then can be carried out by the missile platform even without seeing the targets. In this case, even 
though the ESM system onboard the defending ship might be able to intercept the helicopter's 
radar signal, it does not necessarily imply the missile will come from the same direction. Also, the 
missile can be launched beyond the line of sight, so that the shipboard radar will not be able to 
detect the presence of the missile vehicle when the missile is launched. So neither the ESM · 





Figure 2. Target Tracking 
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3. Midcourse Guidance 
The third stage is shown in Figure 3. At this stage the missile is launched, and its 
midcourse guidance is done by autopilot. At this stage neither the missile launching vehicle nor 
missile transmits a signal. The defending ship will not be able to intercept any RF signal with their 
ESM system. When the missile comes into the defending ship's radar detection range, the ship 
may be able to detect the rapidly approaching target. However, most anti-shipping missiles are sea 
skimming and at such low attitudes may not be seen before they are very close to the ship. 
_ ,tlill~ • MissUe No RF Signal 
· · Missiie :Pht:forin 
Figure 3. Midcourse Guidance 
4. Terminal Guidance 
7niiJ 'r 
Target Ship 
The next stage of the missile engagement is shown in Figure 4. This stage is initiated 
when the missile turns its seeker on and starts to search for the target ship within a certain range 
of angle. This stage usually takes place when the missile to target distance is between 4 to 12 km. 
The range depends upon how accurately the autopilot program can guide the missile to the right 
location and where the seeker may :first see the target ship after the seeker starts to search. Also, 
because the seeker's transmission provides a clear threat signature to the target ship, the later the 
seeker turns on, the shorter reaction time available for the target ship. There are several types of 
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seekers; RF radar, infrared or a combination of the two. In this thesis we concentrate on a 
monopulse radar seeker as the model since this is the.most.significant threat. 
Seeker Turns on 




1-------- 4 to 12 km --------1 
Figure 4. Terminal Guidance 
After the seeker finds the target, it will change to a lock-on tracking mode. Lock-on is 
shown in Figure 5. At this point, the target ship with receive a steady RF signal. If neither 
'hard kill' nor 'soft kill' is used by the defense ship, the missile seeker will remain locked onto the 
ship until it intercepts the target. 
Missile 
Seeker Locks on Target Ship 
Figure 5. Target Lock-on 
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B. ACTIVE DECOY DEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES 
During the entire missile attack procedure, the defending side has some chances to 
interrupt the missile engagement procedures. The following is a description of how active decoys 
may possibly be used to protect the ship from attack. 
1. Countertargeting Decoys 
This could be employed at stage I when the enemy is trying to acquire the target ship's 
information. If at this time the ship can pick up the signal and verify its threat against a good 
databank, it may launch an active decoy to mislead the attack side. This is shown in Figure 6. The 
assumption made here, is that the defense ship has the threat signal bearing from its ESM system 
sooner than the missile vehicle can capture the target ship with its radar. Using the threat bearing, 
the defense ship can launch active decoys, usually along the threat bearing. Since it is assumed 
that the ESM has a longer detection range than the attackers radar; immediately after decoy 
deployment, the missile vehicle does not see either the ship or the decoy. As time passes, the 
missile vehicle will first see the decoys, and then the ship. The best result for the defender is for 
the missile vehicle to interpret the decoys as real targets and begin to maneuver for the best 
tactical poistion and then to attack. While the missile vehicle is maneuvering, the intended target, 
the ship, will be given time to either escape or take advantages of the missile vehicles' poistion 
change to engage the missile. 
However, this ideal result is not likely in the real world. Using decoys to deceive a search 
radar has an objective to deceive the radar's operators. Unlike a seekers' radar system, processing 
any incoming signals in a fixed routine, an operator can reason, check the speed and course of the 
target, verify his radar information against other sources and decriminate an echo from a decoy. 
Yet, one cannot say the defense is a failure ifthe operator recognizes that the decoy is not the real 
target. The decoy can still provide something valuable to the targeted ship, that is time, which is 
very important on the battlefield. 
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Maximum Radar Range 
;>;J "1ii"'lii~~---iiil·-+iii·J.;~;i-::ii,,iiili __ r Chan~ TCourse Toward 
...... • ~ arget 
/ 
waftts, y 
J Target Ship Missile Platform 
~&~pe~ 
Figure 6. Countertargeting Decoys 
2. Distraction/Dilution Decoys 
The next role that the decoys can play is distraction/dilution. This is performed before the 
missile vehicle begins target tracking with its fire control radar. By deploying several decoys 
around the real target ship, the defender makes it difficult for the missile vehicle to track the 
correct target. Again this problem can be overcome by an experienced operator, but the 
defending ship will gain some time to prepare its anti-missile defense. 
3. Seduction Decoys 
The most important role that decoys can play in anti-missile defense is seduction. 
Seduction can be performed in two cases. The first case is if the defending ship can maintain a 
good track of the incoming missile with its radar, allowing the missile tum-on-time to be 
estimated. The decoy should be deployed before the missile turns on its seeker. When the seeker 
turns on and starts its search, it will lock on the stronger target echo, which if correctly 
positioned, is the decoy. 
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Ifthe missile is not tracked by the defending shipboard radar, or if the defender is totally 
unaware of the threat of the missile before its seeker turns on, then the decoy can still contribute 
to the protection of the ship. When the seeker locks on to the ship, it provides a very steady RF 
signal to the target ship. Even through the steady signal means the ship is being tracked, a decoy 
can be launched "properly" at this point and may still lure the missile away from the ship. Figure 7 
shows the use of a seduction decoy. The critical question is: what is the defintion of "properly," 
or how to deploy the decoy in order to provide protection for the ship? This is the question that 
is studied in this thesis. 
@) Decoy 
Centroid of two 
-::~ ___ _:::::~~~,___~ C\ Targets 
_ Trac ·ng Axis c_)
~-
Tracks the centroid of 
two targets when both 
targets are in the 
.resolution cell 
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Missile stronger source 
when two targets 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
A. THE SCENARIO 
The scenario is shown in Pigue 8. Usually the relative bearing is the preferred axis in 
anti-missile defense, so the heading of the ship is used as the reference axis. 8 M is the missile 
attack angle, 8 D is the decoy angle, RM is the missile distance at which the seeker turns on, and 
Rn is the initial decoy distance from the ship. 
Ship Heading 
0 
Figure 8. The General Scenario 
B. THE PROBLEMS 
For the decoy to provide the best protection, it should be as far away from the defending 
ship as possible, so that the chance of the seeker locking back on the defender is small. But the 
decoy should not be so far away that it exceeds the seekers beam width (i.e., 3dB beam angle). 
This would be out of sight to the seeker. So the problem is to find the deployment angle and 
deployment distance that is an optimized result of distance from the ship and within the 3 dB 
beam width of the seeker. Besides the best angle and range of the decoy deployment, the decoy 
11 
must be a more attractive target then the targeted ship. This study also addresses how much gain 
a repeater type active decoy must have to ensure its effectiveness. 
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IV. THE MODELS 
The purpose of this simulation mo~el is to study the anti-shipping missile's behavior with 
the target ship and decoys both present in the same resolution cell. Basically the missile seeker 
always tends toward the center-of-gravity of the target sources within its acceptance beam. Thus if 
the decoy is stronger than the ship the seeker will tend to point toward the decoy. The key point 
for investigation in this simulation, is how does the decoy power compete with the target ship 
echo power throughout the entire tracking and lock on procedure of the seeker. To make this 
point clear, the following models are programmed. 
A. THE SHIP MODEL 
The ship model we used in the simulation is a frigate, its basic features are shown in 
Table 1. The maneuver of the ship at the time it detects the seeker signal is assumed to be an 
increase of speed to its maximum, but without a course change. 
Displacement, tons 2,750 light; 4,105 full load 
Dimensions, metres 138.1 X 13.7 X 4.5 
Speed 29 kts 
Table 1. Typical Frigate Features. After Ref. [1 :p.696] 
There are two things that must be discussed about the target ship: radar cross section 
(RCS) and the killing distance. 
1. Radar Cross Section 
The RCS of the ship is important in computing the echo power of the ship as received by 
the seeker. Echo power varys significantly with target orientation at high frequency. This is 
because the size of the ship is much greater than wavelength of the seeker, so the incident 
wavelength can easily resolve target details. [Ref. 2:p.Il.l] In this simulation viewing angle 
dependence must be taken into account. This is done in the following way. 
a.. Average RCS Computation 
The average RCS of the frigate is computed using an empirical formula for the 
RCS of a naval ship [Ref. 2:p.ll.l7] 
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1 3 
cr = 52.faD2, (1) 
where {dis the r~dar frequency in megahertz and Dis the full-load displacement of the vessel in 
kilotons. 
b. RCS as a Function of Viewing Angle 
Figure 9 shows the RCS of the naval ship at different viewing angles. The data was 
collected by a shore-based radar instrumentation complex as the ship steamed in a large circle on 
Chesapeake bay. [Ref. 2:p.11.19] 
(BOW) 
180° 
Figure 9. RCS of a Naval Ship Polar Plot. From Ref. [2:p 11.19] 
The average result obtained from (1) was used to scale the RCS in Figures 9 to correspond to that 




Figure 10. RCS of a Frigate Ship Polar Plot 
2. Kill Distance 
0 
The ultimate goal of the active decoy is to lure the missile as far away from the ship as is 
possible. When evaluating the protection provided by different decoys' deployment range/angles, 
the minimum distance is computed between the missile and the center of the target ship. 
However, if only minimum distance is considered, it cannot be determined if the missile will hit 
the target. This is because when computing the minimum distance, the center of the ship was used 
as a reference point. The ship's physical length must also be taken into account when deciding if 
the ship is within kill distance (Ks ). This is given by 
(2) 
where Ls is the length ofthe ship. If Ks < Ws where Ws is ship's width, that is if it is a bow or 
stem approach, then the kill distance becomes the width of the ship. 
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B. THE DECOY MODEL 
The decoy model is basically a rep~ater, The general repeater diagram is shown in 
Figure 11. For the repeater, the transmitted signal is the true replica of the signal intercepted. 
\"/ 
AOA 








RECEIVER SIGNAL HEHORr 
';"" 
-= 
-... tCOHTROL t CONTROL t 
DATA OUT DATA OOT CONTROL 
Figure 11. Typical Repeater Diagram From Re£ [3 :p.39] 




P T = Radar Transmitted Power, 
Gr =Radar Transmitter Antenna Power Gain, 
G DR =Repeater Receiver Antenna Power Gain, 
A =Radar's Wavelength, 
R =Range Between Radar and Repeater, 
Lp =Polarization Loss. 
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(3) 
There is an important component that must be examined: Polarization. Polarization loss (Lp) is 
the loss that occurs when the jammer antenna and the radar antenna are operating with different 
polarization. This is a common occurrence because jammers are generally circularly polarized or 
45-degree slant polarized to accommodate a variety of victim radars.[Ref. 4:p.419] 
The signal from the receiving antenna is passed through the amplitude and phase 
modulation unit, which provides the appropriate modulation for the signal as it passes through the 
output amplifier and the transmitting antenna towards the victim radar. [Ref. 3:p38] The output of 
the repeater transmitter is given as 
where 
G DT =Repeater Transmitter Antenna Power Gain, 
G D = Repeater Amplifier Gain. 
The repeated jammer signal at the radar terminals (PRJ) is then given by: 
(4) 
(5) 
In this type of operation, the output of the transmitter is directed at the intercepted signal. 
This system is referred to as a constant gain system. The output of the transmitter is not 
necessarily the maximum output of the transmitter, but depends on the level of the intercepted 
signal multiplied by the gain of the amplifying system [Ref. 3 :p3 8] 
Since the target ship return signal to the radar is given by: 
(6) 
the jam-to-signal ratio is then given by combining Equations (5) and (6) 
17 
41tcrL~ (7) 
As we can see, the jam-to-signal ratio is independent of range. To illustrate this fact, the following 
data have been used to apply Equations (5) and (6): 
Pr Gr 'A Lp (j GvR Gvr Gv Pv 
200kw 35 dB 0.003 m 3dB 50m 2 10dB 10dB 35 dB 1 kw 
The result is shown in Figure 12. As the figure shows, the jam-to-signal ratio is equal to 7.42 dB, 
independent of range. 
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Figure 12. Jam-to-signal Ratio of a Constant Gain System 
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In reality, the power of the transmitter systems is not unlimited; the gain of the system 
eventually will drive the level of signal to the point that demands maximum power out of the 
transmitter. Having reached this power level, any further increase in intercepted signal will result 
in the same maximum power level out of the transmitter. At ranges less than that point, the system 
operates as a constant power system. [Ref.3:p.43] Having a constant power output repeater, the 
transmitted power received by the radar is then given by 
(8) 
where P max is the maximum repeater power output. 
Combining Equations ( 6) and (8) we can get the jam-to-signal ratio after the repeater is 
saturated: 
(9) 
Figure 13 shows the jamming and signal power for saturation. The decoy saturates at R= 3700 m. 
At this point, the repeater changes to a constant power system instead of a constant gain system. 
At R= 1600 m, the jam-to-signal reduces to 1. This is the bum-through range. Beyond the 
bum-through range the jammer power is less than the target return echo and will not be effective. 
19 
Jam-to-signal Ratio versus Radar Range, Decoy power= 1 kw 
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Figure 13. Jam-to-signal Ratio.ofa Constant Power System 
The above discussion was a description of a typical repeater. In the model used in this 
study, the description must be modified. First, the repeater used in the thesis is supposed to be 
able to respond to any threat· direction, which requires an omnidirectional antenna. Thus, the 
decoy. receiving and transmitting antenna gain can be made equal to one and hence can be omitted 
from the model. Second, the repeater used in this study is an off-board device, the distance and 
angle between ship and decoy will change as the ship starts its maneuver. This ship movement 
implies the distance between missile and ship is different from the distance between the missile 
and the decoy. Taking all this into account, Equations (3) through (9) are rewritten as follows. 
The transmitted radar signal received at the jammer, 
(10) 
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where RD is the distance between the radar and the decoy. Notice that G DR has been removed 
because the decoy's antenna is omnidirectional. 
The output of the repeater transmitter before the repeater saturates is 
(11) 
where both G DR and G DT are equal to one. 
The repeated jammer signal at the radar terminals before the repeater saturates is then: 
(12) 
Now using Equations ( 5) and ( 11) we have the jam-to-signal ratio for the off-board decoy 
case, 
(13) 
Notice the jam-to-signal ratio is no longer range independent. When the missile is far away 
. . R4 
from both the ship and the decoy, -f is approximately equal to 1, This does not have much 
RD 
R4 
effect on the overall jam-to-signal ratio. As the missile approaches the target area, -f will 
RD 
contribute more and more to the jam-to-signal ratio. 







where a new compoment - 2- has been added. RD 
C. THE MISSILE MODEL 
The missile model used in this thesis is the Fei-Lung-1 anti-shipping missile, its basic 
features are summarized in Table 2. 
Mission Surface-to Surface 




Range, Max. 100km 
Altitude Cruise at 30 m, Attack at 15 m 
Warhead 500kg 
Speed Mach0.9 
Fuzing Deployed contact fuzing 
Midcourse guidance programmed autopilot control 
Terminal guidance Active monopulse radar or Passive IR 
homing 
Table 2. Parameters of the Missile Model. After Re£ [5:p70] 
D. THE SEEKER MODEL 
Since the parameters of Fei-Lung-1 missile seeker are classified, this study uses a typical 
magnetron produced by CelsiusTech Electronics as the seeker model. The data for this magnetron 
is shown in Table 3. 
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Center frequency 9250MHz 
Agile bandwidth 400MHz 
Peak power output 100kw 
PRF 3600 pps 
Duty factor 0.001 1/sec 
Pulse width 0.3 usee 
Table 3. Parameters of The Seeker Model 
The gain of the antenna is estimated by: 
where 
41tAr G=--•n ).2 .,, 
A r = Seeker Antenna Aperture, 
11 = Antenna Efficiency Factor. 
The Beamwidth of the seeker is estimated by: 
where 
D= diameter of the antenna. 
(15) 
(16) 
The seeker model chosen is an amplitude comparison monopulse radar. Since the azimuth 
axis is the main guidance component of the missile, the discussion is limited to two-dimensional 
tracking (i.e., azimuth and range) only. Thus, instead ofthe conventional three channel signal for 
the typical monopulse radar, a two channel signal pair is used. 
Figure 14 shows a monopulse radar antenna pattern, channel A and B are both complex 
numbers and can be expressed as A = XA + }YA and B = Xs + }Ys where X is the real part and 
Y is 'the complex part. The monopulse radar locks its tracking axis onto the target by nullifying 
the tracking error, which is given by 
( A-B) E = Real A+B . (17) 
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Channel A 0 Target 
Tracking Axis 
ChannelB 
Figure 14. Monopulse Radar Antenna Pattern 
The patterns of A, B, A+B, A-Band normalized difference~:; are shown in Figurel5. 
1.5.--.--------.--------.----~--.-------~----T---,-~ 
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Off-axis Angle 
Figure 15. Amplitude-comparison Mono pulse Patterns 
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V. DISCUSSION 
Before discussing the effects of different decoy deployments, the missile-to ship geometry 
needs to be de~ed. The geometry can be categorized into two cases, bow/stem attack and beam 
attack. 
In general, a beam attack is preferred by the attacker. In this case, not only does the target 
ship have a higher RCS, which results in a stronger return signal power, but also the longer 
physical cross length provides a higher probability of a hit. Oppose to the attacker's favorite beam 
attack, the defending ship will try to maneuver to reduce its RCS and physical cross section, also 
reducing the maximum angle that the hardkill systems must cover. This is usually accomplished 
by heading into the missile's oncoming angle. 
To cover both cases, bow/stem and beam attack, the following missile-to-ship angle are 
chosen to simulate the optimized decoy deployment: 
*bow attack: 345°,0°, 10°,20° 
*starboard attack: 45°,60°,90°, 120° 
*stem attack: 150°, 165°, 180°,210° 
*port attack: 240°,270°,300°,330° 
A. DECOY DEPLOYMENT ANGLE 
The first thing to be discussed is the decoy deployment angle. Decoys can be launched at 
different angles to protect the ship from the missile attacking angles given above. Table 4 shows 
the protection envelop provided by different decoy developments against a missile coming from 
345 degrees. It is assumed that the missile seeker tum-on distance is 10000 m from the target 
ship. This is 60 seconds before the missile reaches the target at velocity of0.9 mach. The decoy 
deployment distance is set at 150m from the ship. 
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eD Miss eD Miss eD Miss eD Miss 
Dis.(m) Dis.(m) Dis.(m) Dis.(m) 
0 174.38 90 78.96 180 244.25 270 339.71 
10 152.27 100 87 190 266.36 280 331.66 
20 131.91 110 98.76 200 286.74 290 319.89 
30 113.88 120 113.88 210 304.77 300 304.77 
40 98.76 130 131.9 220 319.89 310 286.74 
50 87.01 140 152.27 230 331.66 320 266.36 
60 78.96 150 174.38 240 339.71 330 244.25 
70 74.88 160 197.55 250 343.79 340 221.08 
80 74.88 170 221.08 260 343.79 350 197.55 
Table 4. Decoy Deployment Angle versus Miss Distance with a 345 ° Attack Angle 
Figurel6(a) shows a polar plot of the data in Table 4. Figure 16(b) is the same set of data but 




Protection Envelop (normalized) 
Seeker Turns on Range=10000 m 




Figure 16. Protection Envelope by Different Decoys for a Missile from 345° 
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From the figure we can see that if the missile comes from 345°, then the best decoy 
deployment angles are between 240° to 270°. If the tactical situation does not permit this angle 
of deployment, because the decoy may lure the missile to a sister ship, a wider range from 21 0 ° 
to 330° may still be considered to provide sufficient protection. Similar plots for other attacks 
(bow, starboard, port and stem attack), are shown in Figure 17 through Figure 20. The best 
deployment angles are summarized in Table 5. 
Missile Attack Best Decoy Better Decoy Angle Good Decoy Angle 
Angle (degrees) Angle( degrees) (degrees) ·(degrees) 
0 90&270 80-110 & 260-280 60-120 & 240-300 
10 100 60-120 30-150 
20 110 100-140 50-170 
45 135 12Q-150 75-195 
60 150 120-180 90-210 
90 180 150-210 1.20-240 
120 210 180-240 15D-270 
150 240 21D-270 180-300 
165 255 220-290 195-315 
180 90&270 80-110 & 260-280 60-120 & 240-300 
210 120 90-150 6Q-180 
240 150 120-180 90-210 
270 180 150-210 120-240 
300 210 180-240 15D-270 
330 240 210-270 180-300 
345 255 230-280 210-300 
Table 5. Optimized Decoy Deployment Angle 
From the Figures, we can see a simple fact that the better protection is provided when the 
distance between decoy and target ship is large as viewed from the missile oncoming angle. Does 
this imply that longer deployment range provides better protection? This question leads us to the 
next discussion. 
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Missile Attack Angle= 10 Degree 
90300 
n.---.--- 60 




Seeker Turns on Range=10000 m 




Missile Attack Angle= 120 Degree 
90300 
200 
Seeker Turns on Range=1 0000 m 
Figure 18 Protection Envelope of Decoy for a Missile from the Starboard Side 
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Seeker Turns on Range=10000 m 
Figure 19 Protection Envelope ofDecoy for a Missile from the Stem 
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Missile Attack Angle= 330 Degree 
. 90300 
270 
Seeker Turns on Range=1 0000 m 
Figure 20. Protection Envelope of Decoy for a Missile from the Port Side 
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B. DECOY DEPLOYMENT DISTANCE 
To demonstrate the effect of decoy deployment distance, the following simulation settings 
were chosen: 
• Missile Attack Angle = 0 ° 
• Missile seeker tum on time = 60 second before reaching the target (1 0000 m away 
from the target) 
• Decoy deployment angle= froni 0° to 350°, 10 degrees increment 
• Decoy deployment range= 100 m, 200 m, 300 m. 
The results of this simulation are shown in Figure 21. The solid line is the protection 
envelop provided by the decoy deployed at a distance 100 m from the ship. The dashed line is the 
protection envelop provided by the decoy deployed at the distance of200 m. By examining these 
two protection envelopes, it can be concluded that longer deployment distances provide better 
protection 
Missile Attack Angle=O Degree 
90250 
270 
Figure 21. Effect ofDi:fferent Decoy Deployment Distance (Polar) 
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However, if we deploy the decoy at 300m from the ship, the results do not support the 
conclusion above. The dash-dot line is the protection envelope provided by the 300 m decoy 
deployment. Within certain angles, for example 30° to 60°, 120° to 150°, 210° to 240°, and 
300° to 330°, the protection provided is better than that provided by 100 or 200m decoy 
deployment. But at the range of60° to 120° and 240° to 300°, a 300m decoy deployment 
distance does not provide any protection. To better describe this, the polar corrdinates are 
changed to the Cartesian corrdinates as shown iri Figure 22. 
Missile Attack Angle= 0 Degree 
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Figure 22 Effect of Different Decoy Deployment Distance (Cartesian) 
For a decoy deployed at 300 m, there are two gaps in the protection envelope, from 60° 
to 120° and ~om 240° to 300°. The reason of these gaps is because the decoy is out of sight of 
the missile seeker for that deployment distance and angle. Figure 23 is the illustration of this case, 
fhdB is the seeker beamwidth, Rs is the missile distance when the seeker turns on, LR is the 
length of the seeker resolution cell.Then LR is given by: 
(18) 
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If the decoy is deployed outside this range, the seeker is not affected, and the ship remains the 
only target source for the missile seeker. 
@Decoy 
\ 






Figure 23. Seeker's Resoluction Cell 
To ensure the initial decoy deployment can be seen by the seeker, a simple calculation can 
be done as follows: 
1 
DD < tan(83dB) • (Rs- (SM • (To+ TD)))• 2 sin(SD) 
where 
D D = Decoy Deployment Distance 
SM= Speed ofthe Missile 
To= Operation Delay Time 
TD= Decoy Delay Time 
and other terms are defined as in Chapter IV. 
(19) 
In a real operation, when the ESM system detects the presence of the missile seeker, 
EW personnel or computers may determine what kind of missile is approaching by comparing 
the intercepted signal parameters with a databank. This may supply the speed of the missile and 
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beamwidth of the seeker. But ESM systems cannot determine the range to the missile at the time 
of seeker turns on. This must be done by the radar. This is why it is very important for EW and 
radar personnel to exchange information. If the missile cannot be seen by the radar because of its 
sea skimming feature, a conservative seeker turn on range should be used to accomplish the above 
computation. There are two other factors taken into account in Equation 19, which are 
operation delay time To and decoy delay time T D. When the seeker signals are intercepted by 
the ESM system, it takes some time for the operator or computer to recognize the threat, though 
the later one is usually very short. After the threat has been verified by the EW operator, he 
reports the information either to the Combat Information Center (CIC) or to the bridge. An 
authorized person in CIC or on the bridge then makes his decision to launch the decoy. The total 
time spent up to this point is the operation delay time. After the decoy has been launched, it 
requires time to move to the designated location and be ready to receive and transmit RF signals. 
This time is the decoy delay time. While the defending ship and decoy are performing these 
tasks, the missile is approaching and the resolution cell becomes smaller. 
In conclusion, the longer the deployment distance the better the protection. This is true 
only if the decoy is in the resolution cell of the seeker. If there is insufficient information to 
determine the best deployed distance, a better way is for the ship to deploy the decoy at a shorter 
distance to ensure the seeker sees the decoy. Then the ship should increase its speed or change 
course to separate the ship and decoy and increase the distance as much as possible. 
C. DECOY GAIN AND·POWER REQUIREMENT 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the decoy power received by the seeker must be stronger 
than the target ship echo to pull the center-of-gravity of the two target sources closer to the 
decoy. When the two targets can be resolved, the seeker will track the decoy, instead ofthe 
target ship. The decoy must have adequate gain when it acts as a constant gain system, and 
enough power when it is saturated and changes to a constant power system to ensure that the 
seeker tracks the decoy. 
1. Decoy Gain Requirement 
The decoy gain required for establishing a certain jam-to-signal ratio can be derived :from 
Equation 13 as 
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4ncrL ~R'b (J) 
Gv = 2 4 • s · /.. Rs 
(20) 
For Rv = Rs, L p=3dB and 1..=9250 :MHz, the required decoy power is then given by 
(21) 
Note that the target the decoy wants to protect is assumed in this thesis to be a frigate. The RCS 
of a frigate is as high as 1000 m 2 • This means, the required decoy gain must be as high as 83 to 
86 dB to achieve 7 to 10 dB jam-to-signal ratio. 
2. Decoy Power Requirement 
As stated in Chapter VI, the decoy saturates when maximum power output is demanded, 
Figure13 shows that the saturation point occurs at a range of3700 m and bum-through range of 
1600 m, when the maximum decoy output power is 1 kw. If the decoy maximum power is 
increased to 2 kw, the saturation range becomes 2600 m and the bum-through range is decreased 
to 1100 mas shown in Figure 24. A question that might be asked here is what do those numbers 
mean for the effectiveness of the decoy? We know the target return echo will be stronger than the 
decoy power at the radar receiver after bum-through occurs. If at that moment, both target 
sources are still in the seeker's resolution cell, the seeker will no longer see the decoy as the 
most attractive target. Instead, it will lock back onto the ship. From Equation 19, we can clearly 
see that if the bum-through happens at a shorter range, the seeker resolution cell will be 
narrower thus reducing the probability of two target sources being seen by the seeker at that 
point. So a higher maximum power is desired to prevent an early bum-through. 
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Jam-to-signal Ratio versus Radar Range, Decoy power= 2 kw 
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This thesis has investigated three de~oy deployment parameters. They are the deployment 
angle, deployment distance, and the required gain/power. The result has shown that for the 
deployment angle, better protection is provided when the distance between the decoy and the 
target ship is large as viewed from the oncoming missile angle. This not only keeps the ship at a 
safe distance when the missile hits the decoy and explodes, but also prevents the possibility of 
the seeker jumping back and locking-on the ship. To achieve this goal, the best decoy 
deployment angle has been obtained for each missile attacking angle. Also, because the decoy 
launchers are very simple and do not have very good accuracy, these deployment angles have 
been established as ranges of angles rather than an exact angle. Within these ranges, the decoy 
deployment can still provide protection for the ship. 
In investigating the best deployment distance, we found a longer deployment distance is 
preferred as long as the decoy is in the seeker's resolution cell. The attacker will try to reduce the 
resolution cell size by delaying seeker turn-on to reduce the probability of being jammed. While 
the defender minimizes any delay in deployment to ensure that the decoy can be put far away 
from the ship and still within the resolution cell. 
The gain and power are critical factors in so far as decoy effectiveness is concerned. To 
protect a ship from missile attack, a high decoy gain and power are needed because the ship's 
RCS is large and results in a strong echo power that is difficult for the decoy jamming signal to 
overcome. If the gain and power are limited by the nature of the decoy components, the 
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